![]() And, they brought a Tank Company from Alpha 2-63. ![]() They brought one mechanized infantry company, Alpha Company 2-2. It consisted of the battalion headquarters, Headquarters Company with scouts and mortars. However, the organization that we brought to Fallujah was put together as a specific package for Fallujah. Army officer: "Task Force 2-2 has been operating in country since we’ve been here. We would also keep the lines of communication open and prevent indirect fire from hitting the Marine regiments as they were staging for the attack.” His formidable command consisted of 1-5 Cavalry, a mechanized battalion, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment (1-5 Infantry) (Stryker), the Alpha Battery from his direct-support battalion, 3-82 FA and a couple of radars, the 15th FSB, the forward support battalion, the MP battalion, four aircraft, and the Marine 2nd Force Reconnaissance Battalion.Ĭaptain Jeffrey Beauchamp, U.S. Michael Formica explained, “was that we would prevent anyone from leaving or reinforcing the city. and killing anybody that wants to fight.” His plan was accepted.Īs an addition to Natonski’s force, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Cavalry Division (2BCT/1CD) was approved to form a cordon around the city. Rainey came up with another proposal: “A frontal attack on three different roads with a platoon of tanks on each road. And it, to me, it was a single point of failure. We wanted a rapid penetration to basically disrupt the enemy’s command and control, so that he could not organize his defense."Īccording to Lieutenant Colonel James Rainey, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry (2-7 Cav), the initial plan was “a very narrow penetration into the city, along one axis of advance.”Ĭolonel Mike Shupp was concerned: "Division had the concept that all we should do is a penetration down one avenue of approach. We asked specifically for two mech-armor battalions from the Army to be part of our two regiments, and the purpose for that was as part of our plan we wanted a penetration into the city. We picked our course of action selection, and then we war-gamed it. We had MEF representation, we had Army representation, we had two brigades for Fallujah, and we planned it right here at the Rotunda at Camp Ramadi. Major General Richard Natonski: "Everything from course of action selection to staff estimates, we had an OPT and we brought in representatives from the wing, from the FSSG, from the regiments, the brigades, so they were all a part of our planning process. The division’s formal planning for the assault began in the first week of September 2004. Lieutenant General John Sattler issued the I MEF attack order to initiate the 1st Division’s planning process. We had a couple of sustained engagements." And, they were standing and fighting in a few of these cases, where it all, up to that point, it had almost been always hit and run tactics. They were attacked right after they arrived. In the final week, especially as we began to conduct a RIP with the Army units, we brought Bravo 1/4 up to Abu Ghraib Prison. Lieutenant Colonel Willard Buhl, commanding officer, 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines: "The intensity increased with IEDs, with indirect fire, we had an event a day, minimum, and often every company was attacked at some place in their area of operations. The insurgents were entrenched and emboldened. I think it was pretty clear to us that we would have to go into Fallujah." You could see over time that the enemy certainly was consolidating his gains in the city and preparing. In anticipation of an early attack, the MEF stepped up its offensive operations to get the Marines ready for a fight.īrigadier General Joe Dunford: "It became increasingly obvious for all of us, over the summer, that eventually Fallujah was gonna have to be dealt with. elections in early November, the Iraqi national elections, and the Islamic holy period of Ramadan in October were too politically sensitive to start an offensive. ![]() Their planning was based on three overriding considerations: the U.S. The two considered three windows of opportunity- the last week of September, the second week of November, and the last week of December-that would give American forces at least a two-week block of time to complete the mission. Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi worked with General Casey on the timing of an attack on the city. With the demise of the Fallujah Brigade, military leaders prepare to go back into the city. ![]()
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